4
constructing such a theory. Together they frame their shared object of interest to form a triangle of three unequal sides with no one book equidistant from the other two. And although none of the three authors cites either of the other two books, each one writes with the positions of the others in view, so that together they afford three perspectives on how to theorize L2 acquisition, each cognizant of the others. The resulting three-sided, three-angled configuration defined by three points is not inevitable, since it would be possible to juxtapose any number of other contributions to this long-running debate, as there have been many, which have held many relationships with respect to each other. 
I Johnson (2004): Three sides
Marysia Johnson starts her argument with what she defines as three parties to a "hierarchy of power and control of knowledge in SLA" (p. 2), namely theoreticians/researchers, teachers/testers, and learners. She objects to giving priority to the contributions of theoreticians over those of teachers over those of students, and calls for "a new model . . . in which all participants have equal status, privileges, and rights" (ibid). But this re-distribution of power cannot be realized within the existing L2 research tradition, which Johnson characterizes as "linear" (p. 3), and invested in a "conduit metaphor of knowledge transfer" and "a false belief in the existence of a unidimensional reality" (p. 4) . Johnson rejects what she calls the mainstream "cognitive- 
It values attending to individuals' diversified experiences instead of group norms (p. 16).
This is because sociocultural theory accepts the existence of a "hyperdimensional social reality [where] many voices need to be acquired and accepted" (p. 5). In this sense
Johnson portrays it as open to the contributions of all three parties concerned with understanding L2 acquisition: theorists, teachers, and learners.
Having motivated sociocultural theory on these synchronic grounds, Johnson situates it historically as the third of three successive traditions of L2 research. Chapters 1 through 5-about half of the book-address the first two, behaviorism and the cognitive-computational tradition. As is conventional, Johnson joins behaviorism to Bloomfieldian structuralism and Fries' and Lado's contrastive analysis, then juxtaposes contrastive analysis to the works of Corder, Selinker, and Dulay and Burt, taken as products of early generative attacks on structuralist assumptions about language and language learning.
ii Although the application of behaviorism in theories of language learning is no longer viable, Johnson sees its legacy living on in the experimental methods of cognitive-computational research. She claims that those methods follow from a positivist philosophy of science, in that they extract data from objectified subjects, 6 manipulating and measuring subjects' responses according to pre-established criteria (pp.
10-11). Non-conforming responses are discarded or at best marginalized. Moreover, Johnson criticizes research that analogizes L2 learning to the operation of a computer.
To employ language like "data," "input," "intake," "output," "processing," or "storage"
in the context of L2 learning is to adopt an asocial, mechanistic, orientation where the learner is "a loner in an artificially-created social context . She also finds fault in research that explicitly acknowledges a role for social and performance-based components of L2 acquisition (Canale & Swain, 1980; Bachman, 1990) , on the grounds that it still "present[s] an idealized, homogenized [,] . . . artificial and abstract" (p. 86) notion of human communication. To Johnson, all of this work constitutes a cognitive-computational tradition that "advocates the search for generalizability, the power of statistical procedures, the uniformity of human mental processes" (p. 14). In doing so, it "projects an image of a human being as a giant computer, self-sufficient and alone in the material world" (p. 15).
As an alternative to this nightmarish scenario, Johnson offers the work of Lev Vygotsky (1896 -1934 ) and Mikhail Bakhtin (1895 -1975 turns to Bakhtin's counter-Saussurean emphasis on utterances over abstract sentences, and his claim that the association of typical utterances with specific contexts yields myriad patterns of language use, which he calls "speech genres." Speech genres are necessarily modeled on verbal exchange, so that in acquiring a language, learners appropriate the voices associated with speech genres, adopting them as inner dialogue.
Bakhtin argued that instead of looking for underlying commonalities, study of language should investigate this "dialogized heteroglossia" as the basis of cognition.
Chapter 8 summarizes L2 research that has employed Vygotsky's and Bakhtin's ideas. Some examples: Ajaafreh and Lantolf (1994) use the notion of a zone of proximal development to re-conceptualize L2 fossilization, and to assess the effectiveness of specific error-correction techniques. Sullivan (2000) concludes that the implicit priority placed on equality, freedom, and individual choice in pair-work exercises makes communicative language teaching problematic in the sociocultural world of an L2 classroom in Viet Nam. Gillette (1998) This is revealed in several ways. First, it is a ground rule of conversation that one calls one's partners by whatever name they choose. Therefore it is salient that Johnson resorts to inventing the label "cognitive-computational" to name an approach she opposes. Those who take that approach-which by Johnson's lights include Gregg, Bley-Vroman, Krashen, VanPatten, and Swain, inter alia-don't use that label for themselves. This is in part because they perceive important differences among themselves that no single such cover term would honor. It is also because whatever common denominator might be located in the work of alleged cognitivecomputationalists, that would constitute a rather paltry basis for defining group membership, perhaps akin to identifying cognitive-computationalists as those who value some variety of empirically-based research, a characterization which would likely apply to certain socioculturally-oriented scholars as well.
Second, it is similarly axiomatic that conversation requires one to try hard to understand whatever one's partner values, and why, no matter how alien it may seem.
Johnson displays little such effort. For example, although Chapter 8 includes step-bystep accounts of more than a dozen studies that draw on sociocultural theory, in Chapter 3
she passes over generative L2 research with the remark that "Flynn ( research, but insofar as that distaste prevents her from trying to understand the results of this research, and why those who gather it value it so highly, so far real dialogue cannot take place.
One might add that Johnson reports data collected in some of the research presented in Chapter 8, and interprets those data as support for socioculturally-oriented inquiry into L2 acquisition (granted that the role of data in this tradition is more often to illustrate than to confirm or refute a hypothesis). Johnson does not discount data acrossthe-board as immaterial to theory construction; she only neglects to bring forward data relevant to views she opposes. By downplaying what cognitive-computationalists present as their signature contribution, Johnson doesn't seem to try to understand this work on its own terms.
iii What is more, Johnson sometimes doesn't seem to be listening to herself. The unclarity of whether she wants to unite cognitive and social approaches, or replace the former with the latter, is one inconsistency in her own voice. Another example lies in the gap between her assertion on p. 18 that in behaviorism "language learning (whether first or second) was considered to adhere to the same principles," and the text she cites on p.
23 from Charles Fries-whom she associates with behaviorism-that "Learning a second language . . . constitutes a very different task from learning the first language." Johnson is not the first to fail to hear the dissonance of these two claims, since the identification of Fries with behaviorism is fully conventional (Thomas, 2004) . But it is disappointing that Johnson, as an outsider to cognitive-computational tradition who prizes individual differences that others gloss over, cannot break through to perceive the "heteroglossia" underlying these two remarks.
On the other hand, Johnson's book makes for some good reading. One virtue is that she writes clearly, managing to produce a helpful introduction to sociocultural theory in L2 acquisition that evades the notorious unreadability of many postmodernist tracts (Gregg, 2000) . Another is that some of the work she brings attention to is genuinely (Gass, 1997; Gass & Selinker, 2001; Long, 1996) is the "the closest thing Block places the IIO model at the center of his critique of L2 acquisition theory.
He then organizes that critique around discussion of the meanings of the three terms "second," "language," and "acquisition." Block analyzes what he perceives as disciplinary narrowness and social insensitivity in the field in general, and in the IIO model in particular, from these three angles.
From the first angle, Block objects to the "second" in "second language acquisition," on several grounds. "Second" downplays the multilingual complexity of many learners' real experiences, because exposure to an L2 can destabilize L1 knowledge, and because speakers often move fluidly among far more than two codes within an idiosyncratically-bounded "mass of linguistic competence" (p. 42). IIOoriented studies suppress these complexities to take the "S" in "SLA" at face value.
Block also questions the appropriateness of contrasting "second" versus "foreign" versus "naturalistic" language learning environments, citing evidence that the local context may belie conventional notions of how input to learners differs in these three environments.
Block concludes that the critical determinant of success or failure is "how the individual learner negotiates and carves out an identity in the target language" (p. 55). He concedes, however, that many researchers de-prioritize these matters as a "clutter of variability" (p.
56), concluding pessimistically that the "S" in "SLA" will probably not yield to his favored expression, "additional language acquisition."
Taking a second angle, in Chapter 4 Block advocates revising our sense of the "L" in "SLA." In particular, he finds fault in the IIO-propagated notions of "task" and "negotiation for meaning." Because language use is not limited to information exchange, L2 pedagogy that relies on picture-description or problem-solving tasks ill prepares learners for the range of real discourse. What is more, exercises designed to engage students in negotiation for meaning artificially downplay the social context of language use, wherein negotiation of solidarity, of face, and of identity complexify why and how real people talk. Like Johnson, Block argues that by idealizing language, much study of L2 acquisition marginalizes important social factors. But Block is not trying to do away with research which primes the linguistic over the social sense of "language," only trying to call attention to what a linguistic orientation misses. As in Chapter 3, he admits that scholars may legitimately define their work outside of social factors (pp. 84, 86, 90).
Block's assessment of the "A" in "SLA" recapitulates some of Johnson's critique of mechanical information-processing models, artificial experimental methods, and aggregate data, and depicts Vygotsky's and Bakhtin's work as an alternative. v Block suggests that acquisition be re-conceptualized as a process of participation, or of becoming, wherein learners' affects and attitudes are studied as keys to the process of entering into an L2 "community of practice" (p. 113). He illustrates his argument by analyzing an interview with a Catalan-speaking learner of English, whose experiences in two different "communities of practice"-in a foreign-language classroom, and as a visitor to London-show that her social sensibilities shaped her capacity to take advantage of the language learning opportunities she encountered. As usual, Block ends the chapter by evincing doubt that L2 theory will re-define "acquisition" so as to accept the centrality of social and attitudinal factors.
The book closes with a catalog of what textbooks or overviews of the field have predicted about the future of L2 acquisition. Block iterates his reservations about whether a "social turn" will take place, although he counts his book as evidence that if that turn were to take place, it would substantially improve our understanding of how people acquire an L2.
Block thus shifts, and expands, the definitions of "S," "L," and "A," to include social and interactional issues in each case. Compared to Johnson, Block offers rather more of an insider's view of "mainstream" L2 acquisition theory, in all of its asocial, essentializing, mechanistic, glory; and he emphasizes that he wants to supplement, not displace, the status quo, even as he resigns himself to the continued marginalization of sociocultural theory. That undercurrent of doubt flowing beneath the surface of the text makes Block seem to anticipate that the upshot of his work will be, at best, something more like a feint than a wholehearted social turn. Perhaps this only constitutes a display of polite pessimism with regard to the success of his face-threatening proposals. Or perhaps Block himself is not fully committed to his claim to have demonstrated the value of "more interdisciplinary and socially-informed" study of L2 acquisition.
For this reader, neither Johnson nor Block succeeds in making a case that L2
theory must be redefined to incorporate sociocultural issues. Sociocultural research draws attention to intriguing facts about L2 acquisition that otherwise might not be brought to light, but those facts do not constitute a theory that challenges the validity of mainstream L2 acquisition research. For example, in the chapter on the "L" in "SLA,"
Block gives an extended commentary on Mackey, Gass, and McDonough's (2000) analysis of how learners interpret feedback in stimulated recollections of conversations with native speakers. He speculates that Mackey et al.'s data may reveal more than the researchers were prepared to hear, arguing that they inadequately investigated the impact on their data of gender, language affiliation, and negotiation of identity (p. 82). Block writes "I can think of other things that might be going on" (p. 86), a remark that seems to sum up his approach. Block circumnavigates research on "SLA", stopping three times to call attention to "other things that might be going on. Jordan emphasizes the creative tension between two methods in the development of scientific theories, characterized as Baconian "research-then-theory" induction versus
Cartesian "theory-then-testing" deduction. Along with Popper (but not without acknowledging Popper's critics) Jordan concludes that, since we cannot prove theories to be true, only show that they escape disconfirmation, therefore "the deductive method is the true method of science, and the role of observation and experimentation is to test our hypotheses" (p. 47).
Next Jordan connects the fertile late twentieth-century debate in the philosophy of science to the rise of relativism. Relativism challenges rationalism (and the realist epistemology rationalism assumes), on the grounds that there is no objective reality that science can investigate and hence no independent standards for evaluating opposing theories. Jordan covers developments in the sociology of science influenced by relativism; the radical postmodernist critique of science; and the more tractable relativism of constructivists, among whom he identifies Vygotsky. He accepts postmodernists' and constructivists' political claims, that an entrenched élite protects its disproportionate power, resulting in injustices of many kinds. But he objects that when it comes to building a theory of L2 acquisition, relativism has nothing useful to offer in place of rationalism. To Jordan, the most reliable knowledge about the world comes from developing an explanatory theory according to rules of logic, "scrutinizing [it] so as to discover flaws in terminology or reasoning" (p. 81), then avidly assessing and reassessing that theory's capacity to explain phenomena observed in the environment. This is the core content of rationalism, and to Jordan theory construction in L2 acquisition requires a rationalist basis. Rationalism is not, however, to be confused with science. What counts as science has a broader scope and less precise boundaries; scientists may test theories rationally, but arrive at them through various means.
A long Chapter 5 is the heart of Jordan's book. He summarizes the case for rationalism, then evaluates four existing views of what makes an adequate theory of L2 acquisition. Jordan first criticizes relativists for failing to distinguish between two separate complaints: against disciplinary narrowness (about which Jordan feels relativists should be free to make their case), and against prioritizing rationalism as the key to L2 theory construction (a complaint Jordan flatly rejects). To Jordan, insofar as relativists investigate L2 acquisition atheoretically, or claim that no theory is intrinsically superior to any other, so far they do not contribute substantively to the discipline, even though their calls to increase interdisciplinarity and attend more to the local social context of L2 learning may have independent merit. ix Moving on to the writings of Kevin Gregg, Michael Long, and Barry McLaughlin, Jordan represents their diverse ideas about the contents of L2 theories as much more constructive, although he still finds room for improvement in each case.
All this sets the stage for the "Guidelines" Jordan presents at the end of Chapter 5 (pp. 114-118), a tri-partite set of principles for evaluating candidate theories of L2 acquisition. First, Jordan formally states six assumptions: the "minimally realist epistemology" that an external world exists and can be studied; that research cannot be separated from theory; that theories explain phenomena; that research attempts to solve problems; that a unique scientific method cannot be formalized; that we need many theories, not a single paradigm. Second, Jordan specifies five criteria for evaluating theories. Theories should: be coherent, cohesive, and clear; have empirical content; be fruitful; be broad; be simple. Third, Jordan lists six practices and characteristics to be avoided, as indicative of "pseudoscience": too-casual approach to evidence; lack of falsifiability; failure to explain; attempts to derive writers' "real" meanings by interpreting their language; refusal to acknowledge criticism; and predilection for obscure prose.
x Jordan presents his Guidelines as a tool for discerning what works and what doesn't among attempts to theorize L2 acquisition. In his opinion, scholars who accept the Guidelines form a research community whose business it is to create more, and more daring and varied, theories and then to submit those theories to rigorous critique according to rationalist principles.
In Part 2 of his book, Jordan wields the tool of his Guidelines to assess existing attempts at L2 theory construction. He separates those attempts into three groups:
generativist-inspired theorizing about Universal Grammar in L2 acquisition; "Approaches to SLA that offend the Guidelines"; and "Signs of progress," theories that come closer to meeting Jordan's critieria.
Jordan's treatment of generative research in L2 acquisition stretches over two chapters. Chapter 6 introduces Chomsky's work (in curiously elementary terms, beneath the level of sophistication presupposed by the rest of the text) and reviews points raised by a sample of three of Chomsky's critics (Jean Piaget, Geoffrey Sampson, and Elizabeth Bates Overall, Jordan's application in Part 2 of the argument he built up in Part 1 comes across as something of an anticlimax. That is because, first, Part 2 relies heavily on secondary sources-many of the same standard textbooks and digests that Block relies on-so that Jordan's commentaries don't always seem to derive from firsthand exposure to the work he is assessing. This doubtless rendered the task of writing the book more manageable, but it likely limited Jordan's creativity: a pity. Second, in Chapters 8 and 9
Jordan doesn't always go deeply enough into specific proposals about L2 acquisition to justify his evaluations or explore their ramifications. xi Even in the case of generative L2 theory, to which he devotes 42 pages, Jordan leaves hanging the key issue of the poverty of the stimulus. In Chapter 8, he dismisses six "offensive" approaches (seven, if one counts his recapitulation of the argument against relativism) in 34 opinionated, informative, but thin, pages.
IV Conclusion
Stepping back to bring all three books into view, it is worth pointing out that what Jordan's Part 1 as an extended argument for the value of rationalism in L2 theory construction. Individual students could then be made responsible in depth for one or more of the "offensive" or "sign-of-progress" theories (or for other proposals about L2 acquisition: Block's book, Johnson's book). The students' first task would be to assemble and master a bibliography of the relevant primary sources. Eventually, they would take turns presenting to each other the contents of one or more proposals, and (1996, 2002) and Gregg (2000 Gregg ( , 2002 . All three texts under review cite some of this work. Block and Jordan do so extensively.
ii Thomas (2004) vi This may represent a softening of Block's stance, compared with the more confrontational tone and less accommodating position Block (1996) staked out.
vii Kevin Gregg (personal communication) pointed out that Jordan sometimes uses the term "rationalism" where "realism" would seem called for, for example in opposition to relativism or constructivism. Jordan expands the sense of "rationalism" so that it not only contrasts with empiricism and positivism as a research methodology that prioritizes deduction over induction, but also labels an orientation that accepts the existence of an independent world liable to scientific inquiry. Jordan mentions realism as an initial assumption of rationalism (p. 115). See Gregg (2003) for background.
viii Don't skip Jordan's footnotes to Chapter 2, in which he has buried entertaining firsthand anecdotes about the contentious late twentieth-century philosophy of science pantheon, thundering at each other like gods on top of Olympus.
ix Jordan (p. 98) includes Block and James Lantolf among relativists he criticizes in these terms, a characterization that seems rather too broad.
x Jordan attributes to Casti (1989) the first five of the six hallmarks of pseudoscience.
xi One annoyance is Jordan's persistent failure to distinguish references to Rod Ellis versus Nick C. Ellis, despite the fact that both scholars get more than passing attention.
Consulting the index doesn't help, as it lists a single entry for "Ellis, R., N" (p. 287).
